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The incredible complexity of the Second World War continues to fire the 
imagination of the public and historians, alike.  However, historians have largely ignored 
the immense importance of communications within the respective campaigns.  This thesis 
will begin to redress this oversight by showing the role of military communications 
within the United States Army in Europe during World War II.   
In the wake of the war, the United States Army’s Center of Military History 
commissioned a large series of histories detailing the conduct of the US Army during the 
war.  Interestingly, there were three entire books devoted to the Technical Services; 
specifically, the Signal Corps.  In the decades after, the Center of Military History has 
continued to provide examination of the signal services, with a branch history of the 
Signal Corps published in 1994.  Despite this profound endorsement, the academic 
community has not seen fit to give this subject its due diligence.  Modern histories of 
World War II make very little mention of the difficulties of communication, if any 
mention is made at all.  Even amateur efforts have been spotty and sometimes slipshod. 
Using a variety of modern texts, period works, and primary research at the 
National Archives, this thesis will use a narrowing lens approach to showing the multi-
faceted dimensions of military communications.  From lessons learned in the Pacific and 
the Mediterranean, the organization and implementation of cohesive communications 
allowed command and control to function.  By the commencement of Operation Cobra in 
July of 1944, the US Army had the most complete and flexible communications 
organization on the planet. The success of this organization can be seen most clearly 
iv 
during the German Winter Offensive of 1944-45, known as the Battle of the Bulge, when 
despite the rapid penetration of Allied battle-lines, at no time was communications cut-
off between Northern and Southern forces. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
AM – amplitude modulation, a radio system in which the data of the signal is encoded 
within variations of signal power (amplitude). 
Carrier signals – a commercial wire system that allowed a single wire to be used for 
multiple simultaneous transmissions. 
Crystal control – a system of radio tuning using the piezo-electric characteristics of 
precisely ground quartz crystals to allow instant push-button tuning to the crystal’s 
manufactured frequency. 
FM – frequency modulation, a radio system in which the data of the signal is encoded 
within variations of signal frequency. 
Hertz – a measure of the number of radio wave oscillations per second.  During WWII, 
this was referred to as cycles per second. 
PTT - Postes Télégraphes et Téléphones, the French Postal Service, which controlled 
wire and telegraph lines within France. 
Radio relay – a system of beam-antennae radios utilizing high power sets to transmit 
over large distances despite interfering terrain features. 
RPL – Rapid Pole Line, a system of overhead wire construction substituting two 20-foot 
building timbers for the usual 40-foot telephone pole. 
Spiral Four – a communications cable in which four wires were spiraled around a central 
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Military history is a subject that continues to fascinate the amateur and 
professional historian alike.  As the professional historian’s craft has evolved over the 
years, greater attention has been paid to the myriad complexities inherent in all aspects of 
armed conflict.  Within this popular field, western historians hold a particular fascination 
with the Second World War.  Whether from a desire to explore the last “good” war, or a 
more professional drive to understand the most destructive war in human history, 
historians have spent the years since 1945 trying to cope with the war’s terrible cost and 
lasting effects.  Even in the new millennium, scholars struggle with many of the questions 
surrounding World War II.  For the military historian, this war presents a situation where 
most of the lessons from previous wars were suddenly upended.  Perhaps for this reason, 
as well as to understand how this conflict changed the face of warfare between nation-
states, military historians have examined the weapons, tactics, strategy, logistics, 
production, organization, and conduct of the war. 
Despite these and many other subfields within the history of the Second World 
War, there is one that has almost become forgotten as the actual events recede from 
collective memory.  The study of military communications represents nothing less than a 
fundamental oversight on the part of modern military historians to understand the critical 
links between commanders and their armies in the field.  Without realizing it, the process 
of commanding armies spread over a wide area has devolved into a simple moving of 
pieces on a map.  In actuality, the communication links between officers and subordinates 
have been a vital concern during all wars, but especially World War II.  As armies grew 
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in both size and complexity during the nineteenth century, the commander could no 
longer effectively control the movement and disposition of an army on the battlefield by 
physical presence alone.  Entrusting subordinates with a greater degree of individual 
initiative could help on the fringes of the battle, but subordinates were often unaware of 
the overall picture.  This potentially left elements of armies vulnerable to isolation and 
destruction.  Communications had to evolve from the horseback messenger, through the 
telegraph, and on to telephone and radio systems. 
In the years after World War II, the US Army commissioned a large series of 
academic works on the Army’s role in the war.  Known collectively as the “green” books 
for their original green binding, the process of documenting the entire war was a massive 
undertaking for the fledgling US Army Center of Military History.  Begun in 1946, the 
production of these works took decades.  Within these volumes, three books stand out for 
their extensive coverage of communications.  The three books on the operations of the 
US Army Signal Corps, The Emergency, The Test, and The Outcome, represented an 
attempt to catalog the immense contributions made by that branch to the Army’s ultimate 
triumph.  Tragically, these highly detailed works have become largely forgotten, and as a 
result, almost no modern histories of World War II contain mention of any aspect of 
military communications.  Stokesbury’s A Short History of World War II, Keegan’s The 
Second World War, and Hastings’ Inferno: The World at War, 1939-1945, all make 
various mention of some of the many technological innovations of both Allies and Axis 
powers during the course of the war.  However, while tanks, aircraft, trucks, radar, and 
atom bombs are all discussed at least in some aspect, the positive transformation of 
communications during the war is completely absent.  It is interesting that a number of 
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veterans-turned-military historians seem to better understand the critical importance of 
communication in warfare.  While its subject is outside the realm of this work, Robert 
Forczyk’s Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942 makes mention of radio 
communications several times within the context of the German ability to call for 
Luftwaffe support of ground operations.1  As a former tank commander himself, Forczyk 
must understand the importance of effective communications for the conduct of modern 
mobile warfare.  There is also some small interest in communications within the amateur 
history sector, though without a strong professional backing for the field, much of the 
work remains questionable in its assertions and sources. 
This work represents one of a very small group of hopeful first steps in 
reintroducing military communications to the mainstream of professional military history.  
The previously mentioned US Army Center of Military History continues to produce 
academic work on the subject of communications.  Rebecca Robbins Raines produced a 
branch history on the Signal Corps entitled Getting the Message Through as recently as 
1996.  Examining the evolution of the branch from its creation during the American Civil 
War, Raines describes the many changes and innovations during the years since.  
Because some aspects of military communications involve the understanding of scientific 
principles in physics and electrical engineering, there is also a small amount of cross-field 
work on the subject.  Dr. Richard J. Thompson, Jr.’s 2007 work on the adoption of crystal 
tuning for radios in the US Army, Crystal Clear: The Struggle for Reliable 
Communications Technology in World War II, provides an excellent overview of the 
struggle to utilize this new technology during the war, despite (or perhaps because of) his 
                                                 
1 Robert Forczyk,  Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front 1941-1942 Schwerpunkt, (South Yorkshire, UK: Pen 
& Sword Military, 2014). p. 49. 
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background in science and mathematics.  Even though these works offer the hope of a 
rekindling of the field within the greater body of military history, there is an enormous 
amount of work remaining before military communications can take its place within the 
narrative of the Second World War.  Additionally, the complexity of the communications 
subject presents a challenge to the historian.  Therefore, it is important to describe the 
narrow focus of this work.  An admittedly important aspect of communications, signal 
intelligence, is not examined.  It is certainly true that the efforts of many groups to 
intercept and decode Axis signals paid handsome dividends during the European fight.  
However, this subject has been examined in numerous works over the years.  This work 
will therefore confine itself to the study of communications within the US Army, as well 
as the systems for allowing command and control of its elements. 
Before diving into the subject of communications within the US Army in World 
War II, some clarifications need to be made.  The study of signals during the war in large 
part revolves around the Signal Corps itself.  The Corps was not only responsible for 
organizing the systems of communication within the Army, it also bore the responsibility 
for research, development, production, procurement, and supply of a host of technical 
gadgets.  Of course, wire and radio communications were the hallmarks of the new, 
modern system.  But the Signal Corps also led research and development projects that 
produced radar in all of its many functions, for aircraft detection, gun laying, navigation, 
and even all-weather bombing. Additionally, the Signal Corps was expected to provide 
trained signal personnel for every branch that required it.  Not just the Army, but the Air 
Corps, the War Department, and even the military weather service relied on the 
signalmen to a large extent.  The Signal Corps also was responsible for ensuring and 
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controlling the communications of Army commands from the division level all the way to 
the President.  Below the division level, signalmen were under the control of their unit 
commander, but these men were still both trained and equipped under the supervision of 
the Signal Corps.  In many ways, the story of improvement and evolution within the 
Signal Corps represents a microcosm of communications within the Army itself. 
What follows is an examination of communications within the US Army during 
the war.  Chapter 2 begins with the state of the system before the US entry on 7 
December, 1941.  As with all aspects of the Army, the Signal Corps was woefully 
unprepared for the modern war it was suddenly expected to conduct.  Even though 
maneuvers in the Carolinas and Louisiana had revealed glaring deficiencies in the 
existing signal plans, new equipment and procedures were still in their planning and early 
production phases when the war formally began with the bombing of Pearl Harbor.  In 
Europe, the Signal Corps got its baptism of fire alongside the Army in North Africa.  
Concurrently with the Army as a whole, the Signal Corps learned valuable lessons that 
would inform its future use and equipment.  Sicily and Italy presented their own unique 
challenges with continued improvements for the signalmen.  However, as Paul Kennedy 
explains in Engineers of Victory, the problem of an amphibious assault against a fortified 
position was a daunting one.  In spite of its challenges, an amphibious assault would be 
required to invade the Mediterranean and the European mainland.  In Chapter 3 this work 
looks at the buildup of forces in Britain prior to the planned invasion of the continent and 
the D-Day invasion of Normandy.  By the summer of 1944, a truly astounding amount of 
personnel and equipment was stockpiled for the invasion of France.  Despite this, the 
assault on Utah and Omaha beaches was still the greatest challenge faced by the US 
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Army up to that time.  The signalmen of the First US Army struggled to establish 
effective communications amid the enormous complexity of Operations Neptune and 
Overlord.  Nevertheless, the valuable experience from the Mediterranean paid off, with a 
robust and efficient communications system quickly established on the beachhead.  
Chapter 4 deals with the aftermath of the Normandy landings, the breakout from the 
hedgerow country, and the German winter offensive of 1944-45.  It was here that the 
Signal Corps experienced in essence its “final exam”.  To its credit, the emphasis on 
flexible communications, and improvised solutions to problems served the signalmen 
well.  Also within this chapter, the new ability of the Army to coordinate with its various 
arms comes to the fore.  Following the breakout from Normandy, effective 
communications between infantry, armor, artillery, and air power formed the US Army 
into a formidable fighting force capable of dealing decisively with many different 
battlefield situations.  Finally, the concluding chapter describes the last months of the war 
in Europe, and its aftermath for the Signal Corps.  Here also is a brief glimpse into the 
lasting effects of modern communications on US military as well as civilian life.  It is 
fervently hoped that this work will contribute to a new exploration of communications 
within the context of the Second World War.  It is also hoped that with a greater 
understanding of the most expensive war in human history, in terms of both production 




Pre-War and First Steps in Europe 
During World War II, the United States Army was able to attain levels of 
command and control that had not previously been seen.  By the end, commanders were 
able to communicate effectively and continuously with far reaching combat elements, as 
well as the multitude of support structures that facilitated modern war.  Yet the 
examination of US Army communications in World War II must begin not with the 
eventual successes of the Battle of the Bulge or Operation Cobra in 1944.  Instead, it 
must begin with the lessons learned in the Mediterranean, including North Africa, Sicily, 
and Italy.  Concurrently with the army as a whole, the communications organization and 
structure learned invaluable lessons in the fires of combat -- lessons which would benefit 
it enormously in the years to come. 
Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor on 7 December, 1941, the US suddenly 
found itself in a global war.  Although some foresight on the part of Roosevelt and his 
staff, as well as rising Lend-Lease production, had begun to prepare the US industrial 
economy for a war footing, there remained an immense shortage of organized production 
for the implements of war.  Following a policy of isolation that reigned supreme after the 
Great War, the US Army was miniscule compared to what it would become.  From its 
pre-war low of under one-half million troops, the Selective Training and Service Act of 
1940 eventually drafted over ten million servicemen by 1946.2  Among the many facets 
of modern war that US production would have to accommodate, the production and use 
of advanced signals equipment was one of the most difficult and complex.  However, for 
                                                 
2 Peter Doyle, World War II in Numbers. (Buffalo, NY: Firefly Books Ltd., 2013). p. 29. 
8 
 
all their grumblings about lack of preparation, the commanders of the Signal Corps found 
that with the creation of a new modern army, essentially from scratch, there existed an 
opportunity to modernize quickly with cutting-edge developments in communications.   
Peacetime military maneuvers of the late 1930s had shown numerous deficiencies 
in the communications organization and equipment of the US Army.  Particularly in the 
case of the Texas and Louisiana maneuvers in May of 1940, the Signal Corps was 
revealed to be deficient in many aspects of the rapidly modernizing Army.  With its pre-
war emphasis on domestic defense, the Signal Corps was reliant on commercial wire 
circuits to handle much of its expected workload.  While many new innovations were in 
development, the radios on hand were deemed unsatisfactory.  The “mobile” radio SCR-
197 could not function without the men first stopping, setting up equipment, and starting 
the power generator.3  Radio frequencies were overcrowded and subject to frequent 
interference, and there were extensive calls for wired communications links, far beyond 
previous estimates.  Additionally, much of radio’s role in these maneuvers was limited to 
the wireless projection of hand-keyed Morse code.  Some of the many takeaways from 
these early experiences were a greater provision for the construction of wire 
communication lines, the decision to pursue crystal tuning for vehicular radios, and the 
gradual adoption of frequency modulation (FM) for radio.  Afterwards, FM sets began to 
see wider development, though AM was also used throughout the war.  Also, there was a 
clear need for voice communications or at least, high-speed telegraphy.  Hand-keyed 
telegraphy was too slow and required personnel trained to use Morse code, who were in 
short supply. 
                                                 
3 Rebecca Robbins Raines, Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. Army Signal 
Corps. (Washington D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1996). p. 241. 
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The sudden drive to increase military production in the early years of America’s 
participation in the war drove the Signal Corps to unprecedented levels of authorized 
expenditure.  The end result of this rapid expansion in signal spending was that by the 
end of September, 1942, more than 2.5 billion dollars in contracts had been awarded to 
American and Canadian companies.  A further 3 billion was available pending the 
creation of more industrial capacity. 
While radio has captured the imagination and attention of historians, especially 
after Operation Overlord, it was wire communications that connected the Army.  “Wire 
and wire signaling devices had long been the core of signal operational equipment and, in 
providing the bulk of communications for large Army installations in World War II, 
would remain so.”4  Radio was invaluable in providing communications for units on the 
move, especially tanks and aircraft, but wire and telephones continued to link units from 
companies up to army corps.  Additionally, the vast complex of supply, logistics, 
medical, intelligence, and many other departments utilized wire communications to 
coordinate with the frontline troops.  However, the construction of wire in a combat 
theatre was hampered by the tedious task of constructing overhead lines for single-
channel communications.   
Two innovations solved this problem.  The first was the use of commercial carrier 
technology.  “Thanks to the application of the commercial carrier system to the military, 
a single wire circuit could carry not one but several signals simultaneously.”5  Therefore, 
the number of wire lines that had to be constructed was drastically reduced.  However, 
the wire of the time, W-110-B, was both very heavy and prone to electrical shorts.  
                                                 
4 Ibid, p. 63. 
5 Ibid, p. 63. 
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Additionally, it was excessively vulnerable to enemy fire and climatic conditions.  The 
innovation that solved this problem was a British invention known as spiral-four:   
It received its name from the arrangement of its four wire conductors, 
which spiraled around a fiber core.  The whole, wrapped in wire shielding, 
then encased in an insulating rubber jacket, was devised to provide long-
range carrying power with minimum electrical loss and cross talk.  
Flexible, half an inch in diameter, of a tensile strength over 600 pounds, 
yet not excessively heavy, it could be handled far more expeditiously than 
other cables that the Signal Corps had used before.6 
 
In addition to these properties, spiral-four was able to provide voice communication over 
a distance of up to 40 miles without using any repeating equipment.  Finally, the robust 
structure of the cable allowed it be simply laid on the ground or buried in a shallow ditch, 
greatly relieving the construction requirements for armies in the field. 
Of course, the use of wire communications in wartime was nothing new.  
Telephone and telegraph lines had featured prominently in the Great War, and every 
belligerent country in the world used this technology heavily in the Second World War.  
What made this war different, however, was the volume of traffic and the speed of 
transmission.  The primary impetus to increase the speed of Morse signals came from the 
Army Airways Communications System, who used a system of radiotype to send weather 
reports between distant stations.  “At this date AACS weather reports had to be manually 
enciphered, transmitted, and deciphered, all of which took so much time, often in the 
hands of rather unskilled operators, that the reports might be received hours later, too late 
to be valuable.”7  The solution came in the form of automatic radioteletype, RTTY.  This 
system synchronized two machines, far distant from one another, and automatically 
handled encoding and decoding as well as message transmission much faster. 
                                                 
6 Ibid, p. 66. 
7 Ibid, p. 219. 
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 Although wire would handle the bulk of communications in Europe, there 
remained a critical need for reliable radio communications.  Certainly, infantry and 
armored units in motion relied on radio, but also aircraft and transoceanic 
communications.  While the military radio industry changed very rapidly, a look at a few 
of the most widespread radio types is warranted.   
For the infantryman, portability was the key factor in a successful radio.  Pre-war 
models often required either multiple men or pack animals to carry the disassembled 
radio, which had to be set up before a link could be established.  For this reason, the 
primary infantry radios of the US Army in World War II were made smaller and had a 
correspondingly limited range.  Until the new infantry radios SCR-300 and SCR-536 
could be ready for service, the army had to make use of existing sets, such as the SCR-
511.  The “pogo” radio, as it was known, was a single man-operated AM radio operating 
between 2-6 megahertz (MHz).  The nickname came from its unusual appearance.  The 
antennae for the 511 sat atop a short vertical staff, with the battery and transmitter 
attached to the infantryman’s body.  While some poorly trained communicators thought 
the stake at the bottom of the staff was for stabbing into the ground, it was actually 
intended to be placed in the guidon holder on a saddle.  Stabbing it into the ground 
subjected the set to an impact it was never designed to withstand.  The 511’s range of up 
to 5 miles was impressive for the time, but the set was widely disliked because it was 
bulky and interfered with the signalman’s movements.  The SCR-300, or “walkie-talkie,” 
was designed in 1942, though it did not reach front line units until Sicily in 1943.  
Carried on an infantryman’s back, it weighed 38lbs and had a range of about 3 miles.  
The carrying soldier or a closely following officer could operate the set while on the 
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move.  This radio was frequency modulated, and operated from between 40-48 MHz.  Of 
course, it was not a perfect set.  For one thing, the radio utilized a 15-pound battery and 
consumed one battery charge every 20-25 hours.  This meant an almost continual supply 
of fresh batteries had to be sent to forward units.  The final, and perhaps best known, of 
the infantry radios was the SCR-536, or “handie-talkie”.  Originally designed as a stop-
gap radio for use by paratroopers, the SCR-536 became one of the most widespread 
radios of the Second World War.  Weighing only 6 pounds and covering a frequency 
range of 3.5 to 6 MHz, the 536 was an infantryman’s friend.  The problems with the 
SCR-536 were that it was a pre-set, single channel radio.  This meant that the channel 
could not be changed in the field.  Additionally, it had a limited range of up to one mile 
in ideal circumstances.  On confined battlefields, such as within a city, this range could 
be severely reduced.  For example, the report on the battle for Brest by VIII Corps in 
1944 stated, “SCR 536 radios proved to be of little value, as transmission and reception 
was unsatisfactory in buildings.”8 
While the infantry struggled between effectiveness and portability, the 
commanders in the field suffered no such trouble.  Simply put, the SCR-299 was the field 
commander’s communications dream come true.  Originally commissioned for the 
armored forces, the SCR-299 was widely adopted by large infantry units and even British 
allies.  This large set was commonly mounted in a truck or half-track, with a towed power 
supply.  As long as the vehicle could be provided with fuel, the SCR-299 could transmit a 
reliable voice signal up to 100 miles.  Furthermore, when using sky-wave transmission 
                                                 
8 VIII Corps report, Fighting Cities, 1944; Records of the Adjutant General’s office, 1917- (General’s 
Office); WWII Operations Reports 1941-48 (Op Reports); Record Group 407 (RG 407); National Archives 
at College Park, College Park, MD (NACP)  
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(the bouncing of the radio signal off the atmosphere), it could send continuous wave 
telegraph signals over 2,300 miles.9 
The Army Air Corps (later the US Air Force) and artillery units also used radio 
extensively.  Gone were the days of World War I biplanes using hand signals or flares to 
communicate with each other and the ground.  Now the pilots needed to be able to 
quickly communicate with ground control and each other.  The adopted radio was the 
SCR-522.  Converted from the British TR-1143, the 522 was smaller, lighter, and 
covered a larger frequency band: 100-156 megahertz.  It also featured crystal-tuning, 
which allowed quick and reliable selection of up to four pre-set channels.  In fact, the 
major problem with the 522 was that there were never enough of them.  The superior 
nature of the set, combined with the interchangeability of parts with British sets, caused 
the British to immediately order five thousand of the new radios.  However, this was 
blocked by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, General Arnold, who decreed that US 
demands must be met first.10  Despite the feverish demand, domestic production of the 
new set was sluggish.  British concerns over secrecy caused production to languish well 
beneath the optimistic projection of 3,000 per month. 
There are a few technical factors affecting the use of radio in wartime that must 
be explained -- namely, the differences between AM and FM.  Amplitude Modulation 
(AM) involves the transmission of radio waves with the message contained in the form of 
fluctuations in power, amplitude.  While this system certainly functions, it is highly 
susceptible to changes in the power as it travels through a medium, such as air.  These 
                                                 
9 Raines, Getting the Message Through. p. 293. 
10 Dixie R. Harris et al., The Signal Corps: The Test (December 1941 to July 1943). (Washington D.C.: US 
Army Center of Military History, 1957). p. 80. 
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power changes take the form of static on the signal and can come from a large number of 
possible sources, including: atmospheric disturbances (the Aurora Borealis), solar 
activity, storms producing lightning, and even the electrical systems of vehicles and 
buildings.  In contrast, Frequency Modulation (FM) involves the carrying of the message 
through slight variations in the frequency of the radio waves.  Since the receiving FM 
radio set filters out other modifications to the signal, there is no loss of fidelity due to 
environmental conditions. 
Radio waves travel through many different mediums.  Although radio does travel 
through the ground (ground-wave), this form was limited in its usefulness during World 
War II and hardly used.  Instead, radio waves were broadcast through the air, either 
within line-of-sight or by bouncing the signal off the ionosphere (sky-wave or skip-
wave).  For battlefield communications, the vast majority of radios utilized line-of-sight 
transmission; however, this is something of a misnomer.  While the signal between two 
radios is clearest in a direct line of sight, radio waves bounce off most surfaces, allowing 
communications to function even in heavy jungle, albeit with a greatly reduced range. 
 Radio and wire communications handled the vast majority of messages in the US 
Army in World War II, but they were by no means the only systems in use.  Visual 
messaging, courier messengers, and even pigeons all provided yeoman service 
throughout the war, although their contributions varied widely by theatre.  Perhaps the 
strangest of all signal services were the pigeon units.  Seemingly anachronistic, the 
unique ability of pigeons to return unerringly to an established position allowed them to 
function when all other forms of signaling failed.  However, the use of pigeons was 
limited in the case of rapid movement of forces.  “Before the birds can be used in any 
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situation, their home loft must remain in one place at least a week before they will settle 
there, having become so familiar with the location that they return to it invariably.”11  
Pigeons were often used as backups to more modern systems, or in times of radio silence 
when there were no wire lines available.  Not all physical messengers had wings, though.  
The US Army utilized a large number of couriers to move messages.  Simple soldiers, 
motorized vehicles, and even aircraft were widely used to communicate between units of 
soldiers or even theatres of combat. 
Visual signaling was widely used at the lowest levels of army organization, 
especially the squad or platoon.  Simple hand signals could be used to communicate with 
comrades over very short distances without alerting the enemy to one’s presence.  
However, these signals were rudimentary by later standards, able only to convey simple 
commands.  Signal lights or flashlights could transmit prearranged signals at night or 
even use Morse code for more complex messages.  Even marker panels were used to 
communicate with aircraft overhead. 
Before any overseas communication system could be created, an enormous 
number of highly-trained specialists were needed.  Signal Corps personnel required 
advanced training in a number of technical disciplines.  The problem of creating such a 
technically proficient force was daunting.  “The scope of technical signal training was 
broader than ever before.  It had penetrated a field of study hitherto occupied only by 
scientists and confined to highly scientific institutions such as research laboratories.”12  
The training of these technicians at a sufficient rate was a cause of great concern for 
                                                 
11 Ibid, p. 382. 
12 Harris et al., The Signal Corps: The Test. p. 186. 
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Signal Corps leaders, and the scarcity of well-trained operators would be keenly felt in 
North Africa. 
The primary signal school at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey was created in 1925 
and stood as the sole signal training center for the US Army by the start of World War II.  
Obviously, the capacity for training signalmen of all types had to be quickly increased.  
Additional training centers at Camp Crowder and Camp Kohler were created by the 
summer of 1942.  However, there remained significant problems.  The Signal Corps was 
responsible for providing trained personnel in many different areas, not just radio and 
telegraph, but radar operators, cryptographers, pigeoneers, clerks, and even truck drivers.  
Additionally, the rapid pace of preparation for Operation Torch caused men to be pulled 
from the schools before their training was complete.  One of the problems was 
organizational.  Army Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E’s) had not kept up 
with the sudden transition to a wartime footing, so there were shortages of men in 
training.  “Where Tables of Organization existed at all, they were unrealistic for both air 
and ground units.”13  An attempt at a solution was to shorten the scope of the training 
programs in order to produce recruits faster, but this simply caused a greater demand 
since there would be more men needed to cover all the jobs. 
Signalmen were also expected to be combat proficient, since they would often be 
at or near the front lines.  However, there was an early lack of marksmanship training at 
both Camp Crowder and Fort Monmouth.  Each training center had thousands of recruits 
in training, yet there were only 400 World War I-era rifles at each facility.14  The primary 
weapon of the signalman was the M1 Carbine, yet there was no training or even exposure 
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to this weapon.  The struggle to balance combat and signal responsibilities was never 
completely solved.  Even in May, 1944, a JASCO (Joint Assault Signal Company) unit 
was asked “To what extent must signal units provide their own protection?”  The unit’s 
response was, “They cannot provide protection and get communications installed soon 
enough.  We are prepared to provide protections but it retards us.”  Furthermore, the unit 
reported that basic combat training was inadequate.15 
It was not simply the number of recruits that worried the Signal Corps leadership, 
it was the quality as well.  Prospective signalmen needed a reasonably high degree of 
intelligence and formal education to absorb the tremendous amount of information in 
only a few weeks or months.  However, so many branches were also seeking the best 
candidates that some unsuitable recruits were received: 
G-1 of the General Staff had informally promised that men for the Signal 
Corps’ replacement training centers would be drawn, as far as possible, 
from the northeast, north central, and Pacific coast reception centers, in 
areas where the general level of education was higher.  But an 
examination of the records of 338 recruits received at Camp Crowder on 
two days in midsummer revealed that they had come from Fort Bliss, 
Texas, and that fewer than one percent were college men; about 17 percent 
were high school graduates; 45 percent had completed grade school or had 
had “some schooling.”  Over 36 percent were illiterates.16 
 
As the United States entered the war in Europe, a fundamental question was 
where to commit US resources and combat troops.  Early calls for an invasion of France 
in 1942 foundered on the simple fact that there was no way to build the necessary 
stockpile of supplies and manpower in time.  Nevertheless, US leaders felt compelled to 
contribute somewhere.  Following pressure from Churchill, President Roosevelt agreed 
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that North Africa provided just such an opportunity for the first Allied joint operations.  
The British campaign in North Africa had been hard fought since 1940 and it was here 
the US Army had its baptism of fire.  For this operation, three separate task forces were 
assembled combining US and British forces.  The Western Task Force would be 
convoyed across the Atlantic directly from America.  Its job was to invade the Atlantic 
coast of Morocco.  The Central Task Force, comprised of US and British troops, would 
land at Oran.  Meanwhile, the British Eastern Task Force would attack Algiers.17  Once 
landed, the plan called for the three forces to link up and push eastward, threatening the 
German rear.  At the same time, rising British forces, now under General Bernard Law 
Montgomery, would attack westward and the German Afrika Korps would be caught in a 
giant pincer.  Against the Allied invasion force of 63,000 men and 430 tanks, the Vichy 
French and Italian resistance was light.  However, despite the peril of the two-front war 
in Africa, German forces finally got the reinforcements they had been pleading for since 
the campaign began.  The first battle between German and American forces was a 
sobering experience for the green US troops, as well as their commanders.   
While Operation Torch would ultimately be successful, the army and its signal 
personnel learned many difficult lessons.  US industrial production was still mounting 
and the rushed preparations for Torch caused a drain on the buildup of forces in Britain.  
One of the problems in signals came from a desperate lack of spare parts for repair and 
maintenance:   
Unfortunately, spare parts were nearly always components of end items on 
the contract, and the pressure to get out quantities of end items was heavy 
and unremitting.  Rather than interfere with production lines, 
manufacturers often asked for, and got, waivers on the required spare parts 
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groups.  The result was that increasing amounts of equipment did go out 
into the field, but, lacking spare parts, soon became immobilized.18 
 
Even when the necessary equipment was built, there were widespread problems in getting 
it to the correct units.  Early shipments of material to Britain had been poorly organized 
and catalogued.  “Moreover, equipment was poorly marked, badly packaged, hard to 
identify, and often misrouted.”19  Compounding this problem was the fact that troops 
were shipped to England on fast troop ships while their equipment followed on slow 
convoys.  With the need for immediate formation of units, rather than waiting for their 
equipment to arrive, units were frequently issued with equipment from existing stocks in 
Britain, causing a drain on the buildup of signals equipment for future cross-channel 
operations. 
The available lessons from Operation Torch became evident very early in the 
operation.  For one thing, during the beach assault, communications would be 
coordinated by signals equipment mounted in naval ships.  For example, Patton’s 
headquarters of the Western Task Force aboard the Augusta, comprised of a combined 
message center, was too large to fit in one room.  The solution was to spread the center 
into multiple rooms in different parts of the ship.  Not only did this cause confusion, but 
the signalmen operating the center were inexperienced and undertrained.  These 
personnel were relieved of duty by Navy signalmen before noon on D-Day of Torch.  
After this correction, communications from ship to shore were only operational for two 
hours before being knocked out by the shock from the Augusta’s own guns firing.  
Although the signals system was fixed and operating well by the end of the second day, 
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the loss of communications during the initial landings contributed to the signal 
difficulties.20 
The second major problem of landing communications was one of pre-invasion 
organization.  Although the commanders had planned for the early landing of multiple 
SCR-299’s, including twelve separate sets across the three landing zones, very few made 
it to shore in the initial landings.  The cause for this problem was a combination of rough 
seas that delayed unloading of ships and the fact that these heavy vehicle-mounted radios 
were loaded deep in the holds of the supply ships where they could not be accessed.  As 
signal units came ashore, there was no equipment for them to operate and little 
knowledge of when and where it might become available.  The equipment that did come 
ashore was sometimes useless by the time it reached them, since inadequate 
waterproofing caused numerous sets, especially vehicle-mounted radios, to become 
inoperable.   
Despite these many problems, commanders and signal troops worked hard to 
improvise communication solutions.  The excellent armored vehicle radios in the 500 
series were used to transmit traffic through the command nets of the 1st Armored 
Division.  The 1st Armored Division’s signal officer, Col. Williams, explained this 
capacity for improvisation and flexibility.  “We drove a tank up to a command post and 
sent [General Doolittle’s] messages to the tank battalion headquarters, and from there 
they went to the combat commander, to the II Corps to Gibraltar and it really worked.”21  
Some of the command nets were also supplemented by the use of small infantry radios, 
though only in separate nets and within shorter ranges. 
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 While radio had provided critical links in the first days of the invasion, as the 
forces moved east toward Tunisia, a vast network of wire communications was needed in 
its wake.  While spiral-four cable could be lain on the ground, it was better to suspend it 
along traditional pole lines.  These lines would be able to handle larger numbers of cables 
and thus, more channels for communication, provided that it was well back from the front 
lines.  However, in North Africa there were few sources for the large numbers of forty-
foot telephone poles needed.  An expedient solution was Rapid Pole Line (RPL).  Under 
RPL, two twenty-foot building studs could be connected to form the normal length poles.  
However, this was only partially successful, as the makeshift poles could not handle the 
weight of the lines and were adversely affected by moisture and sunlight.  Another 
expedient solution was the assumption of control over French North African civilian 
telephone and telegraph cables.  Although heavily damaged by German forces during 
their retreat to Tunisia, these lines were rehabilitated and pressed into service by the 
Signal Corps. 
Despite these improvisations, the immense size of the North African theatre 
required still more communications options.  It was here that the next great innovation in 
signaling also made its debut: radio relay.  Originally taken from a request by Eisenhower 
to have communications in his car, radio relay allowed a signal to be transitioned from 
radio to wire, or vice versa.   Radio relay also allowed a signal to pass quickly between 
areas impassable to wire lines, like very mountainous terrain.   
Upon the fall of Tunis in May, the mobile headquarters station radioed the 
news to Hill 609, whence it flashed back in four giant mountain hops over 
the 400 miles to Algiers, some twelve hours before the usual wire circuits 
became available and a message center was set up at Tunis.  This first 
American Army radio relay system handled large quantities of II Corps 
traffic and press reports, with interruptions due to equipment failures or 
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atmospherics amounting to less than 5 percent of the time, a percentage of 
outages much smaller than that suffered by wire lines in the same area.22 
 
The problem with radio relay was the size of the equipment and its lack of portability.  
Usually, a radio relay system had to be installed on prominent hills and required 
conspicuous antennae.  This meant that the system would be impractical near the front 
lines, where the equipment could draw enemy fire. 
If Operation Torch introduced the American Army to the problems of modern 
warfare, especially amphibious operations, then Husky was the first test of lessons 
learned.  One of the primary lessons from North Africa was the tremendous importance 
of effective communications to establish command and control.  “Most important of all 
from the Signal Corps point of view, the North African campaign had again demonstrated 
the importance of military communications of the modern army.  Army-wide acceptance 
of this fact significantly influenced all other campaigns to the end of the war.”23  While 
the landings in North Africa had been successful, there were numerous glaring 
deficiencies that had to be fixed before the Sicily invasion.  To its credit, The US Army 
seemed to take many of these lessons to heart.  There were much greater precautions 
against the shock of naval gunfire knocking out communications aboard naval ships.  
There was even the provision of a dedicated communications ship, the Ancon.  These 
steps were still not sufficient to ensure effective communications, however.  “The radio 
operators, the message center and code clerks, and the war room staff were badly 
cramped for space.  Radio stations were scattered in widely separated places on the ship.  
This made it difficult to control operations, limited the number of channels that could be 
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provided, and slowed up the clearing of radio messages.”24  Despite this oversight, there 
was no complete breakdown of ship-board communications during the landings, as had 
happened in North Africa.   
The situation on the beaches was also much improved over Torch.  For Husky, 
signal servicemen were allowed to prepare their own equipment for landing, especially 
ensuring effective waterproofing.  Additionally, the failure to unload the truck-mounted 
SCR-299’s was solved by mounting them instead in 2 ½ ton amphibious vehicles 
(Dukws).  These vehicles were able to maintain communications offshore until it was 
safe to approach.  In one case, two of these vehicles, finding themselves at the wrong 
beach, drove for six miles through the sea to reach their designated area.25  Unlike the 
beaches of North Africa, the landings in Sicily proceeded well, with local command radio 
nets operating efficiently.  While the landings went well for the signalmen, a new 
problem emerged.  The rapid advance of Allied troops over the island quickly exhausted 
the supplies of wire that had been provided for the invasion.  “There were some tight 
moments in the first three days of fighting, for the assault troops had brought in only 
sixty miles of assault wire and needed more than twice that amount.”26  While this initial 
difficulty was solved by the arrival of fresh supplies on the fourth day, the consumption 
of wire on Sicily continued to be enormous.  “The II Corps’ 53d Signal Battalion 
installed hundreds of miles of spiral-four in Sicily—in fact some 1,500 miles of wire 
lines of all kinds as the men kept up with the ground forces.”27 
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It was at Sicily that a new radio organization also saw its first use.  The Signal 
Information and Monitoring service (SIAM) was designed to monitor friendly radio 
traffic, watching for improper security procedures and informing commanders of 
important developments before they went through all the standard channels.  The 
response to the presence of SIAM was mixed.  On the one hand, the monitoring for 
security breaches was widely used to ensure greater operational secrecy.  However, the 
process involving interception of important messages was disliked.  Col. Williams of the 
II Corps reported that, “entirely erroneous concepts were obtained from eavesdropping 
and from the reports of inexperienced, irresponsible liaison officers.”28 
Husky showed what effective communications could look like.  Nothing in 
wartime ever works perfectly, but both the men and equipment in Sicily worked to the 
satisfaction of both field commanders and Signal Corps leaders. However, the next hurdle 
would be in Italy, and that operation would show that many things could still go wrong.  
By the start of operations against the Italian mainland in September of 1943, both army 
commanders and signalmen had gained valuable experience.  Even before the 
pacification of Sicily in August of 1943, plans were already in progress for the next 
invasion.  Sicily was an obvious “stepping stone” from North Africa to Italy, so it was no 
surprise that the next phase would be concentrated here.  Unfortunately, although Italy 
withdrew from the Axis powers, German forces in Italy were strengthened and also knew 
the Allies were coming.  The landings in North Africa and Sicily had been successful in 
large part because of a lack of concentrated resistance.  This would not be the case in 
Italy.  Operation Avalanche planned for the invasion of Salerno by American forces with 
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a subsequent linkup with British forces in the toe of Italy.  German forces in Italy were 
well prepared for Allied arrival and the landing at Salerno was met with fierce resistance.  
“As the first assault waves reached the beach, enemy artillery, mortar, and machine gun 
fire began to rake the landing areas.  German resistance was far heavier than it had been 
at the invasion of Sicily.”29 
Signal planning for Avalanche had continued to improve on the experiences of 
North Africa.  However, enemy action swiftly complicated these intricate plans.  “In the 
early morning darkness, members of radio teams often became separated, and as a result 
many teams were unable to operate.”30  The intense combat conditions on the beach did 
nothing to help preserve radio equipment, and many sets were damaged by rough 
handling or enemy fire.  Signalmen also struggled with a shortage of signal vehicles, 
especially wire-laying vehicles.  In desperation, the construction teams of the 36th Signal 
Company used infantry jeeps to move wire, and succeeded in laying 90 miles of wire on 
the first day alone.  The link up with British forces was a precarious one, especially after 
a German counter-offensive threatened to split the two armies.  Only a narrow strip of 
coastline linked the two forces, and through here, messengers rode at breakneck speeds 
on motorcycles to carry valuable information, often under artillery fire. 
The Italian campaign quickly swallowed men and equipment at exorbitant rates.  
The signal planner for the invasion, General Moran, had wisely provided for extensive 
supply.  In fact, signal supplies were arriving so fast that the signal supply troops had 
difficulty keeping up.  The critical problem that emerged in Italy was a shortage not in 
equipment, but manpower.  Moran lamented, “last night, six men allegedly radio 
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operators came in.  One was an infantryman with no communication training, one was a 
barber, and the others had only basic radio operator training.”31  By the end of the first 
week of the Italian operation, there were only fifteen qualified replacements for an army 
of signal personnel of over 20,000.  Desperate, Moran cannibalized other uncommitted 
signal units, including Patton’s 1st Armored Signal Battalion. 
The topography of Italy also hampered the signalman, even as it strengthened the 
German defender.  German forces could utilize existing cable systems while Allied 
troops had to create their own.  Small infantry radios were not capable of utilizing the 
sky-wave, so the mountainous terrain often blocked transmissions.  Additionally, the 
extremely rugged terrain limited the usefulness of vehicle radios like the SCR-299.  Wire 
communications had to be utilized, but the construction of these lines was extremely 
difficult.  In places, the terrain was so rough not even pack animals could carry the wire 
so it was hand carried by the troops.  Breakages in even the spiral-four cables were 
common, due to both enemy fire and allied misuse.  Infantry night patrols often used the 
wire as a guide rope during night missions or to help climb embankments.  Spiral-four 
was robust, but never designed for this kind of treatment.  Both messengers and pigeons 
were used extensively in Italy, with the pigeons carrying sometimes as many as 300 
messages per week to a single headquarters. 
The Italian campaign continued to the very end of the entire war, and as the troops 
moved northward in the winter of 1943-44, the signal load increased almost 
exponentially.  Even in the opening states of the invasion, in September 1943, the code 
rooms of the US Fifth Army were averaging 23,000 code groups per day.  In early 
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October, the commander of the 63d Signal Battalion reported that even though he was 
authorized to use three SCR-299s for large volume traffic, he was actually using 
seventeen.  All of these sets were in use continuously, twenty-four hours a day.  Clearly 
the established guidelines for communications equipment were grossly insufficient for 
the task.  “Signal officers in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy often felt that staff planning in 
Washington, especially at the War Department level, was unrealistic, not yet fully aware 
of the actual communications needs of such a war as World War II was proving to be.”32 
 The US Army suddenly found itself thrust into a Second World War, with 
enormous deficiencies in manpower and equipment.  However, by the end of 1942, the 
signalmen of the army had gained valuable combat experience and learned a great deal.  
Further operations in Sicily and Italy reinforced the importance of military 
communications in the prosecution of a modern war.  However, the “final exam” lay 
ahead.  By the start of 1944, major plans were in motion for a cross-channel invasion.  
This Operation Overlord would require previously unheard of amounts of men and 
materiel.  (Western Allied) Victory in the war for Europe lay in northern France and 
Germany.  The US Army and the men of the signal companies would need every 
advantage if they were going to crack Fortress Europa. 
 
                                                 




Buildup and D-Day Invasion 
American campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy served to illustrate 
deficiencies in US equipment and tactics, particularly with regards to communications.  
However, by the time of the Normandy landings, many of these problems had been 
addressed.  Nevertheless, the operation in Italy had shown that an amphibious landing in 
the face of organized and determined resistance was still not something to be taken 
lightly.  “When, eventually, they did come ashore in France to pursue a full invasion, 
they were going to have to be very, very good.”33 
Despite British wishes for continuing offensives on the periphery of German 
territory, American military leaders understood that an invasion of France brought the 
best prospect of a victory.  As early as 1942, some US military leaders had argued for the 
opening of a second front in France.  Since the British Isles would be a natural jumping 
off point for such an invasion, American and Commonwealth forces began to build up 
forces in Britain for the European operations to come.  “The first build up of men and 
equipment in England for a cross-Channel attack against the Continent had been drained 
away to North Africa in late 1942, and it had been necessary to build again.”34 
BOLERO was the codename given to the buildup of forces in Britain. Military 
leaders on both sides of the Atlantic quickly realized that American involvement in 
Europe would require an immense amount of supplies and manpower.  Furthermore, the 
distance across the Atlantic meant that all supplies needed for operations on the continent 
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would have to be brought to England first.  However, despite the rapid advances in 
industrial production in the US, it would take time for a comprehensive force to be 
assembled in Britain. 
Even before the United States’ formal entry in the war, the close relationship 
between America and Britain allowed for early steps at cooperation and coordination.  In 
May 1941, a US army signal officer, Col. Matejka, was sent to England to begin working 
with the British.  He quickly forged important links in what would become a complex, 
multi-faceted effort to become a fully Allied force.  “By the time the United States 
entered the war, the Signal Corps had already established informal relationships and 
working arrangements with the British that paid handsome dividends later.”35  During the 
early buildup, there were many confusions and shortcomings, including among the Signal 
Corps. As was mentioned in Chapter 2, the early policy of shipping manpower and 
supplies separately but starting at the same time caused confusion in the British supply 
yards:   
Until May 1943, troops and equipment were shipped to the theater at the 
same time, organizational equipment being force marked.  This 
arrangement was never popular with supply men.  Troops sailed on 
transports, equipment was loaded on slower cargo vessels.  Thus the time 
and place of arrivals of troops and equipment varied widely, and marrying 
up the troops and their organizational equipment meant expending an 
inordinate amount of time and effort…At times some units received two 
issues while others got none.36 
 
Fortunately, this system was fixed by mid-1943.  After that, a unit’s equipment was sent 
ahead of the troops and both were quickly joined once the latter arrived in England.  
From a communications standpoint, even the buildup itself required an enormous amount 
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of signals equipment, personnel, and infrastructure.  Only through an efficient and 
flexible system of communications, even across the expanse of the Atlantic Ocean, could 
a suitable buildup of forces be organized.  After all, the US Army’s supply depots were 
scattered across the whole of the British Isles, including Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and 
England.  Therefore, a comprehensive communications system was created which 
utilized radio, telephone and telegraph lines, messengers, and civilian circuits.   
By D-day, 980 telephone switchboards and 15 teletype writer 
switchboards served the various headquarters in the British Isles.  The 
telephone switchboards had more than 1,200 positions.  That is to say, 
more than 1,200 telephone operators sat at the 980 boards, endlessly 
plugging and unplugging the connections to 32,000 telephones….An 
average of 8,500,000 calls a month went over the system.37 
 
One of the most troublesome of all military problems in the Second World War 
was the difficulty inherent in amphibious landings.  The landings at North Africa, Sicily, 
and Italy varied widely in their exposure of this difficulty, with the landings in Italy 
showing the landing forces’ vulnerability to enemy opposition.  Yet the prospect of an 
invasion of France brought with it another sober reminder: the Dieppe raid.  Three 
months before the invasion of North Africa, British Commonwealth forces, mostly 
Canadian, made an attempt on the port of Dieppe.  It was a tragic fiasco, with the 
landings beaten back in less than a day, and over sixty percent casualties for the Allied 
troops.  British leaders were therefore understandably cautious about an invasion attempt 
in France.  The final decision to push forward with the invasion came from an unlikely 
source: Stalin.  At the Tehran conference in the winter of 1943, Stalin vehemently 
rejected Churchill’s plan for attacking German forces in the Balkans.  His insistence on 
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the opening of a second front against Germany reduced any possible argument the British 
might have had to postpone Overlord.  The landings would happen in 1944. 
Before boots hit the beach, however, there were innumerable items to be planned 
and coordinated between the Western Allies.  Everything from the loading of ships and 
the coordination of aircover to the clearing of beach obstacles and the movement inshore 
had to be carefully considered and planned.  For the Signal Corps, the landings in 
Normandy represented the greatest challenge they had ever faced.  “Yet the signal plan 
for the invasion had to be fully co-ordinated among the services; indeed, it had to be co-
ordinated as no other signal scheme had ever been.”38  To provide this needed high-level 
coordination, the Allies created the Combined Signal Board (CSB) in October 1943.  
This organization was responsible for deciding all matters of shared signals in the 
invasion.  For example, the CSB “standardized the time basis and time expressions in 
messages throughout the theater: ordained a simple single-call procedure for all ground 
force radio communications: established telephone priorities; assigned cross-Channel 
cable and VHF radio circuits; and allocated radio frequencies.”39  This last function was a 
particularly troublesome one, as there were simply so many radios and other transmitters 
expected to be in operation.  “Invasion plans called for a concentration of about 90,000 
transmitters within a limited area of land, sea, and sky.”40  In an attempt to ration out the 
available frequencies, the CSB asked for departments to tell them how many frequencies 
would be needed.  Naturally, this caused a massive overbid for the existing options, with 
frequencies between two and five megacycles being demanded in an amount exceeding 
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the available frequencies by seven times.  Eventually, the CSB was able to reduce the 
requests to manageable levels, and further increased the number of available frequencies 
by reducing the signal space between assigned radio frequencies from five kilocycles to 
four. 
In this highly congested radio plan, it is easy to see how the US Army’s adoption 
of both FM radio and crystal tuning were crucial in preventing disorganization during the 
landings.  If each individual radio operator had to manually tune his equipment, as much 
as the equipment and his limited training allowed, one can imagine the nightmare of 
signals bleeding into other frequencies.  Of course, such technology was not easy to use. 
For example, when the CSB changed the signal space requirements, that meant an 
entirely new batch of crystals had to be ground for the newly allotted frequencies.  There 
was little time to do so, however, since the new frequency allocations were not decided 
until 10 May, less than a month before the invasion.41 
Ultimately, the signal equipment buildup for Overlord was on a similar scale to 
the buildup as a whole: gigantic.  With the lessons of the Mediterranean campaigns well 
learned, signal officers requested and received an enormous amount of supplies. 
The Allies readied huge quantities of short- and medium-range radio sets, 
of wire-line stores for combat use by battalions, companies, and platoons.  
There were tens of thousands of sets waterproofed, their batteries fresh 
and fully charged; hundreds of thousands of miles of assault and field 
wire, enough for the 5 divisions by land and the 3 by air in the D-day 
assault, enough for the 16 divisions that would be in Normandy within 
five days, enough for the million men who would be ashore in three 
weeks, enough and plenty to spare for the losses in battle.42 
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Experience in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy had shown that the amount of signals 
equipment needed for any operation was always greater that what was expected under a 
unit’s TO&E.  Fortunately, the delay of the invasion until 1944, coupled with cautious 
commanders wanting to prepare for the unexpected, allowed the collection of an 
immense amount of signal supplies. 
 US Army leaders made extensive plans for the signal disposition during the 
Normandy landings, but when the invasion actually took place, the confusion inherent in 
opposed amphibious landings quickly complicated the existing plans.  The Normandy 
landings were much larger than any of the operations in the Mediterranean.  Thus, the 
potential signal problems were larger.  One of the most difficult problems of signals 
during the landings in the Mediterranean had been the difficulty in bridging the gap 
between beach and ship communications during the opening phases of the landings.  
Especially during Operation Avalanche, determined enemy resistance had greatly 
reduced the capacity of signalmen to communicate from ship to shore and back again.  
SCR-299’s mounted in amphibious vehicles had helped, but until they could land on the 
beach there was still a lack of front-line information.  A solution devised in the Pacific 
theater was the JASCO (Joint Assault Signal Company).  Utilizing a mix of ground, air, 
and naval personnel, a JASCO unit’s responsibilities included: 
1. Provision of a means to each Battalion Landing Team for the control 
and direction of supporting naval gunfire; 
2. Providing parties to request air support and to advise infantry 
commanders on the use of aircraft in the support of ground units; 
3. To furnish teams for beach communications during the initial phases of 
the amphibious assault.43 
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In essence, these JASCO units coordinated naval and air support, and worked to quickly 
establish communications on the beach.  To this end, the JASCO units were remarkably 
effective despite the stiff opposition encountered, especially on Omaha Beach.  Despite 
losing much of their motorized equipment to enemy fire during the landings and the need 
to give away much of their hand-carried radio equipment to the infantry, they were still 
able to function.  “With the remaining wire equipment and salvaged bits of wire picked 
up from the beaches, the JASCO men, still under fire, set up a skeletal wire system.  This 
was the only communications system on the beach until noon of D-day.”44  The 
communications on Utah beach, where resistance was lighter, was easier to get 
established.  The 286th JASCO was quickly able to establish radio and wire links between 
units and the naval support offshore. 
As a unit concept, the JASCO served an important function, especially in liaison 
work between the disparate branches involved in an amphibious landing.  However, it 
was this very multi-branch composition that caused some of the continual problems 
within some of the units.  For example, during operations in Saipan the JASCO units 
reported unsatisfactory performance from some of the naval personnel. 
…release of the navy officers from the Joint Assault Signal Company 
would increase the overall operating efficiency of the unit.  It is not a 
question of lack of cooperation, but in the Service consciousness, 
appreciable differences in training, different customs, and different 
regulations…Navy officers do not as a rule have the same attitude towards 
responsibilities for their men and equipment that is desired in an army 
officer.45 
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The full extent of inter-branch difficulties within JASCO units is a subject for further 
study, but there is no evidence that similar problems arose during the Normandy 
landings. 
While the US Army had plenty of practice by this point, there were still glaring 
problems.  On Omaha beach, the landing craft were often destroyed by enemy shellfire, 
or attempted to release their cargo in water that was much too deep.  Even on Utah beach, 
the veteran 50th Signal Battalion encountered severe difficulties in setting up a message 
center.  “Prematurely landed in water so deep that most of their equipment was washed 
away, the men struggled ashore through heavy shelling and began operations as best they 
could.”46  Early communications on Omaha were not much better, with many infantry 
and vehicle radios being lost to enemy fire, water damage, and rough handling.  This 
situation must have seemed eerily familiar for the veterans of the Italian landings.  
However, the first signal units to arrive with full equipment were generous in sharing 
their good fortune with the men who came before, and the radio plan for Overlord largely 
worked.  The preponderance of crystal-controlled radios prevented the problems of signal 
bleed and frequency confusion, and while the British experienced some difficulties in 
radio reception during the midday hours, the American FM radios came through clearly. 
Overlord also called for the inclusion of two US units of highly trained 
paratroopers.  The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were parachuted into France the 
night before the invasion.  Their objectives were to capture crucial crossroads, both to 
protect the beach forces from an early counter-attack, and to secure the routes of forces 
coming off the beaches.  However, a multitude of factors conspired to obscure the drop 
                                                 
46 Harris and Thompson, The Signal Corps: The Outcome. p. 102. 
36 
 
zones and scatter the men.  Cloud cover, enemy anti-aircraft fire, and inexperienced pilots 
all contributed to this debacle, with many units separated from each other by miles of 
unfamiliar terrain and darkness.  “But being ‘missing’ was not the same as being 
ineffective.”47  Indeed, with remarkable tenacity the paratroopers created ad hoc units and 
succeeded in attaining practically all their planned objectives.  However, the signal 
situation here was bleak.  Combat troops who find themselves surrounded, even on 
purpose, rely on communications to bridge the gap back to their larger forces.  
Unfortunately, the poor jumping conditions, unfavorable ground, and defective 
equipment harnesses caused the loss of the vast majority of the paratroopers’ radio 
equipment.  The 101st Airborne Signal Company retained use of only two radios after the 
drop, and one long-range SCR-499 (an airborne conversion of a SCR-299).  The 82nd 
Airborne Signal Company did not fare better, with only one short range and one long 
range radios recovered.  Furthermore, with the widespread drops, wire communications 
were insufficient.  A detachment of thirteen signalmen struggled with the task of laying 
wire that a full wire platoon of ninety-four men would have found difficult.48  Without 
reliable communications, small unit commanders in the darkness were forced to rely on 
messengers to try to locate each other and form some semblance of cohesion.  Stories of 
disjointed unit movements and uncoordinated attacks on enemy strongpoints abound. 
Once the beachhead was secure, signal equipment flooded ashore and a complete 
wire system was in operation by the fifth day of the invasion.  In addition, antrac systems 
were again used to bridge the gaps in the communications.  General Bradley’s Signal 
Officer, Colonel Williams, a veteran of the Mediterranean campaigns, had made 
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provision for massive surpluses of signal material.  Fortunately, the prospect of the 
Normandy landings had provided great incentive for Williams to attain all the pre-
invasion supplies he might need from the home front. 
With General Bradley’s quick authorization, Colonel Williams 
immediately requisitioned all the antrac equipment that the Signal Corps 
could have ready by mid-1944: about twenty-one 100-mile radio carrier 
systems, each consisting of 2 terminal sets and 3 intermediate relay sets to 
be placed 25 miles apart, plus 100-percent backup spares.49 
 
These new AN/TRC-3 and 4 systems were much improved over the ones used in Sicily.  
The new equipment provided more channels for voice or telegraph transmission, and 
even a facsimile function for the relatively quick transmission of maps and photographs.  
It was this system, in a cross-channel configuration, that allowed photo reconnaissance 
aircraft returning to their airfields in England to transmit their pictures of strongpoints 
and camouflaged targets to the fire control personnel in the landing area within seven 
minutes of development. 
Not even satisfied with these myriad communications options, the Allied invasion 
forces also laid cross-channel cables mere days after the landings began.  Two undersea 
cables were laid from Royal Navy ships on June 10 and 17.  Unfortunately, the Channel 
storm of June 20 that wrecked the Mulberry artificial harbors also destroyed the cables 
when ships’ anchors were dragged along the seafloor during the storm.  It took a strong 
effort to locate the problems and splice in repair cables, which brought both cables back 
on-line by June 28.  “[the cables] were repaired as quickly as the weather permitted, 
although over ten miles of new cable had to be pieced into each cable to dodge the debris 
of the storm.”50 
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The buildup of troops and equipment in England was staggering in its scope.  The 
actual invasion of France brought unprecedented numbers of men and vehicles across the 
Channel and onto the beaches of Normandy.  “All told, the Allies mustered 2,876,000 
soldiers, sailors, and airmen.  They had 11,000 aircraft and several thousand vehicles, 
from great battleships to tiny landing craft that would hold a few men…”51  The Signal 
Corps also dealt with an enormous amount of material.  By early 1944, the Signal Corps 
“was handling approximately 2,500 tons of signal equipment and supplies each week.”52  
The invasion of Fortress Europa was immense, and it had to be.  German resistance on 
Omaha beach and later on the continent proved that the Wehrmacht was still a formidable 
opponent. 
The landings at Utah and especially Omaha beaches proved extremely difficult, 
even for an army as prepared as it could be.  The low-tide landings made equipment, 
personnel, and signal vehicles much more exposed to enemy fire as they moved across 
the wide open beach.  However, with the exception of the initial beach landings, the 
communications plan for the invasion was quickly attained.  Within mere days the flood 
of troops and equipment arriving on the beachhead enjoyed a comprehensive signals 
system, with radio paralleling the extensive wire networks.  The expansive plan for the 
invasion had given its commanders the key flexibility that it needed to maintain 
command and control in the face of the confusion of war. 
Ultimately, the landings in Normandy were a resounding success and the Western 
Front had been truly opened.  While the breakout from the bocage country would still 
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present a formidable challenge, the success of Overlord cannot be denied.  However, the 
failure of German forces to react quickly and decisively to the landings continues to be a 
difficult question.  “The Allies’ early success owed a great deal to the confused and 
hesitant response of their enemy as a result of the FUSAG deception, which continued to 
mesmerize the German high command long after the invasion.”53  In addition to this 
deception, which completely fooled the German high command and especially Hitler who 
thought that the real invasion would come at Calais, it must be added that the activity of 
the Allied air forces before and during the invasion caused significant communications 
failures for the Germans.  While the full extent of this disruption is a subject that merits 
further study, there is widespread anecdotal evidence that the destruction of Axis 
communication lines in France, whether by air or French Resistance activities, had a 
paralyzing effect on the German commanders in the area.  “General Richter, the 
divisional commander, was sitting at his battle headquarters.  He did not know which 
strongpoints were still offering resistance.  No news was coming through to him.  No 
runners arrived.”54 
For the signalmen of the US Army, Operation Overlord would be the last chance 
to learn about the difficulties of communications during a large amphibious landing.  
With the exception of the invasion of Southern France in the face of light resistance, the 
Signal Corps could now focus on the lessons learned in the Mediterranean for 
communications across land.  However, just as each amphibious landing had presented its 
own challenges, the construction of communications in France would not be easy.  It 
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would be here, in 1944 and 45, that US Army communications would face its final 




From Operation Cobra to the Ardennes Offensive 
By July 1944, the US Army was one of the best equipped and supported armies in 
the world.  Vast organizations of medical, logistics, and morale infrastructure were all in 
place to ensure soldiers had all the support necessary for modern warfare.  Additionally, a 
commander in the field could call on the support of other friendly units, naval and 
artillery gunfire, or even aircraft in a short time.  What brought all of these diverse 
elements together was an enormously complex system of the most modern 
communications.  Of course, following D-Day, the Allied armies continued to encounter 
unique difficulties. 
Once the immediate beachhead was secured, the Allied armies attempted to move 
deeper into France.  At the same time, British forces continued to attack Caen, an 
objective they had optimistically planned to capture on D-Day itself.  Also, US forces 
moved west into the Cotentin Peninsula and its port city of Cherbourg.  The port of 
Cherbourg was especially important to the Allies for the continuing supply system from 
Britain.  However, by the time US forces secured the port on June 27, German forces had 
destroyed large portions of the port facilities, and it was not operational again until 
August. 
After the Normandy landings, communications personnel wasted no time 
constructing a complete signals system within the Allied position.  Slow progress after 
Overlord gave them time to establish multiple lines of communication, both wire and 
radio, with other Allied units and with command headquarters still in England.  “First 
Army construction teams had begun to replace their hastily laid field wire with spiral-
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four cable and were swarming over the commercial lines leading to Cherbourg, 
rehabilitating and readying communications for that port city, once it should be 
captured.”55  Nevertheless, this system of diverse communications would be sorely tested 
if and when an Allied breakout could be obtained. 
As US troops and equipment tried to force a path away from the coast, they were 
stymied by the natural terrain of the French hedgerow country or boccage.  “The 
hedgerows…were field boundaries planted by the Celtic farmers 2000 years earlier.  
Over two millennia their entangled roots had collected earth to form banks as much as ten 
feet thick.”56  This sort of terrain was ideal for the defender, and US forces had to fight 
hard for small gains.  For their part, German soldiers showed a remarkable discipline, 
ambushing Allied units from cover or concealment.  This was in spite of the heavy 
interference of Allied fighter-bombers, who continued to roam the skies attacking 
German targets of opportunity such as trains, vehicles, or concentrations of troops. 
British and Canadian troops to the east of American positions were still fighting 
towards Caen.  Unfortunately for them, German reinforcements were slowly being 
moved west into the fight, further strengthening the Wehrmacht’s defense in that area.  
However, this did have the effect of pinning German forces in the east of the Allied 
position and preventing their use against American positions further west.  In an attempt 
to produce a breakout, British general Montgomery initiated an operation named 
GOODWOOD on July 18.  Following a massive aerial bombardment along a narrow 
front, Canadian armored forces attacked east between the Orne and Dives Rivers.  
Initially they made good progress, but the German forces organized a swift line of 
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resistance and destroyed a large number of Canadian and British tanks before the attack 
stalled out. 
By the end of Operation GOODWOOD on 20 July, 1944, Allied forces had 
fought their way to the planned position for D+17.  However, July 20 was D+43.57  
Clearly, Allied forces were behind schedule and the German Army continued to provide 
stiff, if patchwork, resistance.  The battles in the bocage and the swamplands of the 
Cotentin Peninsula inflicted approximately 40,000 US casualties within the First Army 
by the end of July.58  They had also physically and emotionally exhausted the troops, the 
agonizingly slow and dangerous progress taking a steep toll on the men involved.  There 
was some good news.  Innovations in the field, specifically the “Rhinoceros,” allowed 
much faster progress over any remaining hedgerows.  The Rhinoceros was a field 
modification to the M4 Sherman medium tank.  Large, heavy, metal points were welded 
to the tank’s front hull, allowing the Sherman to uproot the dense hedges and plow 
through them without exposing the vulnerable underbelly of the tank.  This field 
modification allowed faster progress through the bocage and reduced the limitation of 
units being forced to move along narrow paths against well-concealed defenses.  
Nevertheless, the German Army continued to mount stiff resistance.  A full breakthrough 
was still desperately needed. 
GOODWOOD provided a blueprint, but it was undertaken in the face of strong 
German positions.  Farther west, German forces maintained a defensive line, but it was 
badly overstretched with practically no reserves or fallback defensive positions.  German 
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commanders in the region were forced by necessity to conduct warfare of a largely static 
nature, far from the rapid armored advances of the early campaigns.  Even veteran and 
highly prized armored units, such as the Panzer Lehr division, were forced to hold 
sections of the battle line. 
For COBRA, the traditional role of pre-attack bombardment was given to the US 
air forces.  The plan represented an immense effort in terms of aircraft and ordinance.  A 
group of 350 fighter-bombers would attack first, followed by 1,800 heavy bombers, 
followed by another 350 fighter-bombers, followed by 396 medium bombers; with a 500-
strong fighter screen to protect the aircraft throughout.59  Each aircraft element would be 
carefully orchestrated and choreographed in timing, altitude, and target area to ensure 
maximum bomb saturation effect and to reduce chances of friendly casualties.  Despite 
these precautions, a number of Allied bombers dropped their bombs within American 
lines, causing casualties and reducing morale right at the start of the offensive.  
Nevertheless, German forces were pounded by the heavy bombardment, inflicting heavy 
casualties on men and equipment and stunning any remaining forces.  “Bombing was 
more than many of them could stand: some went crazy, others surrendered or deserted, or 
drifted to the rear.”60  US forces, supported by roving fighter-bombers, moved quickly to 
exploit the damage.  “In two days American forces drove 15 miles south all along the 
line.”61  As the initial breakthrough shattered the German lines and there were little to no 
German reserves, the First and Third US Armies were unleashed across the whole of 
France. 
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Following the initial breakout, US forces advanced quickly.  The Wehrmacht, 
however, was far from being a passive force in Normandy.  On Hitler’s orders, and 
against the advice of his generals, Operation Luttich commenced in early/mid-August.  
Attacking westward into the Allied flank, the operation was intended to cut off the 
southward advance and push the American armies back to the beaches.  In this it was 
highly over-optimistic.  Allied code-breaking gave Gen. Bradley prior knowledge of the 
impending attack and the American forces were prepared.  Though the offensive did 
make some progress during the night of its initial kickoff, this was quickly reversed after 
daylight allowed Allied air attack on armor, vehicles, and troops.  Even more serious, the 
stalled offensive left large numbers of German units exposed in the west of the 
Normandy front.  Sensing the enormous opportunity provided by the Germans, Bradley 
altered the plans for the conduct of the southward drive.  Sending only relatively small 
units of Patton’s newly created Third US Army into Brittany, the rest were directed into 
an eastward race that threatened to encircle large portions of Germany’s Army Group 
West.  The larger battle to close what became known as the “Falaise Gap” resulted in the 
destruction of the majority of German units fleeing eastward toward the Seine River.  
Furthermore, the continuing Allied advance eastward relentlessly pursued the German 
forces.  Successive rivers failed to stop the Allied advance until by late September it 
stalled just short of the Rhine River and the German border. 
There exist a number of examples of the flexibility of Allied communications in 
the confusion during Operation Cobra.  During the night of 29 July, German columns led 
by tanks attempted to breakthrough US positions at the la Penetiere crossroads.  One 
column was engaged by US infantry and light tank troops but needed help, and so called 
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on the artillery of 62nd and 78th Field Artillery Battalions for fire support.  However, the 
78th was fighting a simultaneous battle of its own, engaging German tanks with direct fire 
from its self-propelled 105mm guns.  The commander of the 62nd authorized its guns to 
split, with half continuing to fire direct on the enemy column, and the others firing on the 
other German column.  The quick and effective communications system between such 
disparate elements toward a common goal is what allowed this victory.  “In this six hour 
night engagement, 450 of the enemy were killed, approximately 1000 surrendered and 90 
enemy vehicles were destroyed.”62 
The First US Army (FUSA) was one of the most experienced American army 
units in Europe by the start of COBRA.  Although there were new replacements and 
some new units, many of the men of FUSA had gained valuable experience from earlier 
operations in France.  “Since FUSA was the only American army to take part in the 
landings and initial combat on the Continent, it contained some of the best-trained and 
most experienced signal units.”63  For this reason, FUSA communications during and 
after COBRA were some of the most effective among US forces in Europe.  Additionally, 
FUSA’s role following the breakthrough was to wheel to the east, turning the flank of the 
Wehrmacht and pushing it toward Germany.  However, the veteran Wehrmacht continued 
to offer stiff resistance, and with the establishment of the Falaise pocket, FUSA was 
tasked with containing and helping encircle the overextended German forces.  This did 
not mean that the progress of First Army was slow.  In fact, “At the height of the rush 
across France and Belgium, FUSA’s command post moved on an average of every four 
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days.”64  It is important to remember the enormous complexity involved in moving an 
entire command post and maintaining or quickly reestablishing communications once 
arrived. 
Just prior to the commencement of COBRA, General Omar Bradley, who had 
commanded US ground forces during and after D-Day, was promoted to command the 
newly operational 12th Army Group.  General Hodges became the commander of First 
Army.  Quickly establishing a rapport with his new commander, the FUSA’s veteran 
signal officer, Colonel Williams, created a leapfrog communications system utilizing a 
duplicate communications system.   
FUSA’s command post moves became virtually painless, considering the 
complexity of such an operation.  Colonel Williams would select the next 
command post forward and would move his stand-by communications 
control to that point while the duplicate equipment was still in operation at 
the old post….As Hodges had remarked, “I never move anywhere until 
Williams tells me I can.”65 
 
Clearly, the commander of First Army understood the enormous importance of effective 
communications.  The leapfrog headquarters system was recognized for its relative 
efficiency and was widely copied by other US commands. 
Also of paramount importance following the initial breakthrough was 
communication with support aircraft.  The fighter-bombers of Gen. Quesada’s IX 
Tactical Air Command were essential in both reconnaissance and enemy interdiction.  An 
observer wrote about a typical example of cooperation between combat commands and 
their overflying support. 
The tank column was just coming up within range of the brow of a hill as 
[the aircraft] appeared on the scene.  “Hello, Kismet Red, this is Bronco.  
Have you in sight overhead.  We have no targets now.  Is there anything in 
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the woods off to the left or over the brow of the hill ahead?”  Five minutes 
later the answer comes back, “Bronco this is Kismet Red…There are 
twelve Tiger tanks about four miles down the road retreating.  Shall we 
bomb them?”  “Yes, go ahead…”  So the P-47’s go down and catch the 
tanks in a ravine.  They blast the lead tank in the first pass and stall it.  The 
others can’t turn around and they are caught like eggs in a basket.  
Systematically the P-47’s work them over from very low altitude and 
destroy them all…66 
 
This example shows the immense value of communications to allow close cooperation 
between ground and air forces.  The further genius of this system was in installing VHF 
radio sets in tanks or command vehicles close to the front of a combat command.  Unlike 
the standard infantry and ground vehicle radios, these VHF sets could readily 
communicate with Allied aircraft in the immediate area and provide a high level of 
coordination.  Furthermore, FUSA began utilizing the service of an airman to liaison 
between the two elements.  The simple fact is that an infantryman or tanker has difficulty 
describing terrain features to an overflying aircraft in a way that can be readily seen from 
several thousand feet of altitude.  Thus, an airman liaison was invaluable in coordinating 
between ground and air personnel.67 
Another important coordination took place between the tanks and infantry.  Both 
of these forces relied heavily upon the other for mutual protection.  Tanks were essential 
in reducing fortifications and combating both infantry and other armor, but the infantry 
was also essential to protect the tanks from enemy infantry tank-killer teams armed with 
held-held explosive launchers like the Panzerfaust, as well as camouflaged anti-tank 
guns.  However, this necessity for communication was not solved so easily.  The primary 
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infantry radios (SCR-536 and SCR-300) did not share any frequencies with the tank 
mounted radios.  An early solution was to attach a telephone to the rear of the tanks that 
connected the infantry with the tank’s interphone system.  This was problematic because 
the infantryman was often exposed to fire while walking behind the tank and the tank was 
severely limited in its speed when followed by an infantryman on foot.  A second idea 
was to issue modified vehicle radios to the infantry, but these sets were heavy and the 
unfortunate infantryman tasked with carrying them often left them behind when in 
danger.  The final attempt was to put modified SCR-300 infantry radios in the tank 
turrets.  Naturally this was disliked by the tank commanders who now had not only the 
reduced room in an already cramped space, but also had the added headache of radio 
operation on multiple sets.  None of these solutions were deemed satisfactory and the 
answer continued to elude the signalmen of the Army until well after the end of the war. 
While First Army conducted the initial breakthrough and moved south and east, 
the Third US Army (TUSA) was tasked to turn a breakthrough into a breakout.  Activated 
under the command of General Patton, the Third Army’s dash across France in 1944 
remains one of the most famous events between Overlord and the Ardennes Offensive.  
From a communications standpoint, however, the Third Army’s rapid deployment and 
advances presented a serious problem.  “Third Army began operations short of signal 
units, equipment, and suitable frequency assignments.”68  Furthermore, the rapid 
movement of troops required a similar movement of the TUSA command post.  Similar 
to Col. Williams of FUSA, Patton’s signal officer, Col. Hammond, used a leapfrog 
arrangement of signal units setting up a forward command post prior to the commander’s 
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actual move.  In contrast to First Army, however, only the sparsest communications were 
established before the post had to be moved again.  At the tactical level, radios continued 
to function adequately, but the rapid pace precluded the use of the extensive wire systems 
that commanders had grown to expect. 
Third Army’s problems of communication were exacerbated by the variety of 
objectives it sought.  Middleton’s 4th and 6th Armored Divisions were particularly 
troubled by communications failures.  The divisions’ rapid advance into Brittany led to a 
crisis of command and control, especially between Middleton and his divisional 
commanders.  It became impossible to lay wire cables fast enough to maintain 
communications. 
After St Lo wire requirements increased continually.  However the 
movement was too fast and the distances involved were excessive.  In 
order to complete the circuits to the combat commands a team was started 
from each end, one laying wire towards the other.  In many cases these 
and other lines were completed shortly before or after the command post 
moved on again.69 
 
The distances even exceeded the capacities of the large vehicles radios in use, such as the 
SCR-299, which could provide voice transmission up to 100 miles under ideal conditions.  
Furthermore, an overall lack of radios in the divisions led to frequency overcrowding, 
with corresponding delays in signal transmission and comprehension.  Messengers were 
widely used in an attempt to improvise a solution, but the distances, coupled with pockets 
of German resistance, meant that even a one-way trip could take up to a day.  By that 
time, the orders were often obsolete.  Fortunately, Gen. Patton had instilled in his 
divisional commanders a confidence and independence that allowed them to continue the 
                                                 




offensive, largely on their own initiative.  “Needing to react quickly to fast-changing 
situations, they could hardly wait for orders, which might be out of date by the time they 
arrived.”70  Signal Corps units continued to work on the problem as the campaign in 
Brittany progressed, and there were some successes, such as the increasing use of radio 
relay.  Having made itself invaluable during the North African campaign, radio relay was 
used extensively in France by Col. Hammond, who used the system to maintain 
communications between Patton and the other theatre commanders.  “All together, during 
August, his men installed 28 radio relay circuits, operating over distances totaling 1,175 
miles.”71 
Although the Allied armies moving through France brought a staggering amount 
of signal supplies with them in the summer and fall of 1944, they also needed to utilize a 
large number of civilian circuits for wired communications.  This was much more 
difficult than it sounds.  Not only had the retreating Germans spent considerable time and 
resources to damage these utilities, but French Resistance fighters had been tasked with 
destroying German communication lines, and they had also been almost continuously 
attacked from the air.  Therefore, it was a herculean feat to bring many of these systems 
back into operation for the Allies.  In the towns and cities, at least, the vulnerable central 
telephone exchanges were sometimes saved by the intervention of local French 
employees, who managed to deceive and limit the extent of the German destruction of 
these vital communications points.  However, this mitigation was only possible in 
approximately one-third of the total civilian communications hubs.  The resulting process 
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of repairing these central exchanges, as well as rehabilitating thousands of miles of 
overhead and underground cables, brought in a multitude of resources for the project.   
The city of Paris, meanwhile, offered a tempting target for Allied forces during 
their rapid push eastward.  However, this was an almost purely political or morale-based 
objective, as German forces reported to be holding the city were light and already 
engaged with French Resistance fighters.  Indeed, Eisenhower was wary of committing 
his armies to the liberation of Paris, chiefly because they would afterward be obliged to 
support the civilian population logistically.  While this may seem a coldly calculated 
position, it was understandable in the environment of logistical concerns that increasingly 
plagued Allied forces during the dash across France.  With none of the large Channel 
ports in Allied hands, apart from Cherbourg, the massive amounts of supplies, equipment, 
and men were still being offloaded on the Normandy beaches.  Then, they usually had to 
be driven by truck to the front, as the French rail system was largely destroyed by Allied 
airpower. 
In the end, the question of Paris was pushed heavily by Charles de Gaulle, the 
commander of Free French forces within the Allied armies.  De Gaulle insisted that Paris 
should be liberated by his own French division under Gen. Leclerc.  Although ordered to 
destroy the city by Hitler, the German commander in Paris, Gen. Cholitz, did not, and 
after a failed attempt to defend the outskirts of Paris, it was officially secured on 28 
August.  Paris did contribute to logistical problems: “On 27 August airplanes began 
delivering 3,000 tons of food, medical items, and soap from the United Kingdom at the 
rate of 500 tons a day.  General Bradley authorized a daily allocation of 60,000 gallons of 
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fuel…for vehicles delivering supplies to Paris.”72  For the continental communications 
system, however, the occupation of Paris presented an opportunity.  As the capitol, Paris 
was the center of the entire French civilian telephone and cable system, the Postes 
Télégraphes et Téléphones (PTT).  That system’s repair gave army signalmen a chance to 
make up some of the lost capacity for wire communications to the armies that had 
occurred during the breakout.  With the help of French civilian engineers, the Signal 
Corps wasted no time in repairing the damaged systems.  “Five months after the 
liberation of Paris, almost 90 percent of the circuits in service in 1939 had been restored 
to service.”73  Even so, there were always problems, especially with the rapid relocation 
of a large number of Army headquarters and support staff commands to Paris before 
comprehensive communications could be established.  In fact, “…a telephone system to 
serve a large headquarters such as COMZ or SHAEF required as much equipment as that 
necessary to serve a city of 30,000 people in the United States.”74 
As the Allied armies raced across France, they continued to strain their own 
logistics systems.  Fuel became especially scarce, especially the farther away from the 
coast an army operated.  “Gasoline shortages also hampered signal operations, 
particularly the work of the construction battalions.  The TUSA signal units required 
nearly 5,000 gallons of gasoline daily.”75  Thus it was not primarily enemy action which 
stalled the advance of the Allied armies, but a lack of supply.  However, the advance 
continued sporadically and more slowly, as fuel and other supplies allowed.  General 
Eisenhower’s “broad front” brought Allied forces to the very border of Germany, but 
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with diminished supplies, only a few advances were given logistical priority.  The 
majority of these supplies were kept in the north, where Montgomery’s British troops 
attacked through the Netherlands in Operation Market-Garden.  Further south, Hodges’ 
1st Army and Patton’s 3rd attempted to make what progress it could.  Between the two 
forces, the defensive sector west of the Ardennes was lightly guarded with resting US 
units containing large numbers of inexperienced soldiers. 
The Battle of the Bulge, as it is called by American audiences, also known as the 
Ardennes Offensive, was actually named Operation Autumn Mist by the German 
commanders who conceived it.  Autumn Mist was designed to repeat the rapid victory of 
the French campaign of 1940.  In this case, however, the emerging panzer divisions 
would be targeting the port of Antwerp, whose recent capture by the Allies increased 
their supply.  Surging out of the Ardennes Forest in fog and snow that kept Allied aircraft 
grounded, the American forces were caught completely off-guard when the German 
forces assaulted and overran FUSA units along a forty-mile front.  Stunned by the sudden 
attack, Allied commanders rallied and poured men and equipment into the line to slow 
the advance and protect the flanks of the bulge.  Fortunately, the belief among both 
Allied and German commanders that Germany did not have the strength remaining for a 
serious offensive proved correct.  The leading panzer divisions developed a critical fuel 
shortage, while at the same time the following infantry divisions, moving without benefit 
of motorized transport, could not keep up with the rapid advance.  Additionally, when the 
inclement weather cleared after almost two weeks, a veritable storm of Allied aircraft was 
unleashed upon the helpless German attackers. 
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In the first few days of the German offensive, FUSA bore the brunt of the attack, 
and its headquarters was understandably confused by the rapidly changing situation at the 
front.  Less understandable was the absence of many of the staff officers on furloughs to 
Paris or the resorts in Spa.  Without air reconnaissance because of the weather, it was 
difficult for Hodges’ men to get an accurate picture of what was happening.  
Compounding this was the use of English-speaking German paratroopers dropped behind 
American lines that tightened security and delayed the ready transmission of information 
or passage of messengers.  For his part, Hodges was noticeably absent from his 
headquarters during the critical first days of the offensive.  According to some accounts, 
he was suffering from influenza that forced his deputies, particularly his chief of staff, 
Kean, to run the show.76  Finally, as German units closed on FUSA’s headquarters, 
Hodges was forced to move his HQ back out of danger on 18 December.  Signal units 
were not prepared for this kind of sudden turn and some bottlenecking of 
communications resulted, but “…by the next morning personnel of the 17th Signal 
Operation Battalion had augmented the existing installations and used its mobile facilities 
to establish both telephone and teletype service to all major units.”77 
The critical point in the Ardennes Offensive was the crossroads city of Bastogne.  
In the first stages of the attack, Bradley dispatched the highly experienced 101st Airborne 
division to the city to prevent its capture.  They arrived only the night before the first 
elements of the newly rebuilt Panzer Lehr division arrived at the town’s outskirts.  The 
entire city was surrounded and cut-off by the 25th of December, a sorry Christmas present 
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for the 101st.  A better one was obtained the following day, when elements of Patton’s 
Third Army arrived at Bastogne to relieve its worn defenders.  Even while it was 
surrounded, the 101st was able to maintain communications with Allied forces through 
the use of radio relay equipment.  With the headquarters section housed in a cramped 
basement, they were still able to beam communications quite literally over the heads of 
the encircling German units.  Allied forces were thus not only aware of Bastogne’s 
continued resistance, but also able to take heart at the 101st commander’s refusal of a 
German surrender demand. 
With the Wehrmacht attack running out of steam, FUSA prepared a counter-
attack.  Launched on 3 January, the new offensive pushed German forces back to their 
starting positions and the Battle of the Bulge was officially over by the end of January.  
Hitler had gambled on a surprise attack causing mass confusion and paralyzing the 
command structure as it had in 1940.  By this time, however, the US Army Signal Corps 
provided a thoroughly flexible system of communications including redundant channels 
that allowed a close cooperation between all the affected Allied forces.  Bradley himself 
gushed about the effectiveness of communications during the Ardennes Offensive. 
From my desk in Luxembourg I was never more than 30 seconds by phone 
from any of the Armies.  If necessary, I could have called every division 
on the line.  Signal Corps officers like to remind us that ‘although 
Congress can make a general, it takes communications to make him a 
commander.’  The maxim was never more brilliantly evidenced than in 
this battle for the Ardennes.78 
 
As in all the many instances of Signal Corps personnel caught at or near the front 
lines, the signalmen in the path of the German attack in December of 1944 fought with 
conspicuous gallantry.  In one case, an important radio relay station continued to operate 
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even after it was cut off from Allied forces and with a German anti-aircraft battery close 
by.  The relay’s position was so treacherous that it could only operate during daylight, 
when the sounds of battle and the front concealed the noise of its generator.79  Clearly, 
the signalmen understood the crucial role they played in the success or failure of army 
operations, and were prepared to incur heavy risks to get the job done. 
After the securing of the Normandy beaches following Operation Overlord, the 
US armies grew almost exponentially in complexity.  To support this complexity, the 
communications systems likewise grew in scale and scope.  In fact, the vast number of 
disparate units created a unique system within the First Army, the locator agency.  This 
valuable administrative system was later copied by the other American armies in Europe.  
In many ways, the work of signalmen in US armies in Europe after D-Day presented the 
culmination of lessons learned in pre-war maneuvers, North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.  
Wire lines were heavily used when the armies were static or slow-moving.  Radio 
attained primacy during fast movements.  When all else failed, messengers could still be 
used.  Throughout all of these different operations, from Cobra to Brittany, eastward to 
Paris, and on to the German Western Wall, the Signal Corps’ emphasis on flexibility and 
improvisation was invaluable.  Furthermore, it must be remembered that the work of the 
signalman is often a thankless task.  Too often it was only mentioned when there was a 
problem.  Yet the fact remains that throughout all the confusing changes, movement, 
sieges, attacks, and withdrawals, at no time did the commanding generals of the Allied 
forces lose contact with each other.  Hodges, Patton, Bradley, Eisenhower, and 
Montgomery were able to quickly and effectively communicate with each other and with 
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their civilian masters in Britain and the United States.  Even the German offensive in the 
Ardennes, which included the goal of disrupting Allied communications, was unable to 
dismantle the multiple redundant systems of wire, radio, and civilian circuits.  It was this 






The defeat of German forces in the Ardennes and the crossing of the Rhine into 
Germany brought no rest for the men of the Signal Corps.   Further demands for wire and 
radio communications continued to come from every US Army in Europe.  Yet with the 
surrender of Germany and the declaration of V-E Day, the Signal Corps could look with 
pride on a truly monumental achievement. 
During the eleven months of operations in the ETO [European Theater of 
Operations], Signal Corps soldiers had laid over 900,000 miles of field 
wire, 105,000 miles during the last month before the surrender.  Some 
650,000 miles of wire and 35,000 miles of cable went into the more stable 
systems.  Since the landings in Normandy, the Third Army alone had 
covered 81,500 square miles of territory with communications circuits; 
32,763 square miles during the last campaign.80 
 
Their success was not limited to wire construction.  Army signalmen, with the 
cooperation of the private industry, developed and produced over 100 different radio 
types with individual uses.  Signal Corps achievements also extended to the home front, 
where the almost complete absence of industrial knowledge for mass production of 
specialized communications components had challenged American efforts to provide the 
equipment needed in the field.  In particular, the risky decision to choose crystal control 
for radio frequency stabilization prompted an enormous increase in the production of 
quartz crystal oscillators.  “The entire output of the crystal “industry” in 1941 was only 
100,000 units.  However, by the end of the war, a full-fledged industry numbering nearly 
150 manufacturers was turning out over two million units per month.”81  
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The Second World War fundamentally changed the conduct of military 
operations.  The harnessing of modern industrial capacity in the military applications of 
the state meant that the new emphasis on mobility and mechanization would only expand.  
For its part, the Signal Corps produced the most complete communications system up to 
that time.  Despite its unpreparedness for major conflict in 1941, by war’s end it achieved 
what only four years earlier would have seemed impossible.  The most cutting-edge 
electronic systems were quickly harnessed to provide clear and reliable communications 
for every member of the combat team, from General to platoon leader.  The early 
problems of implementation and operation were improved with the combat experiences 
of North Africa, Sicily, and Italy.  Finally, US Army military communications reached its 
peak after the Normandy invasion.  Even with the difficulties inherent to the rapid 
movement across France, the US armies was able to maintain cohesion and coordination 
not just with each other and their allies, but also establish close, mutual support between 
infantry, armor, air forces, support services, and logistics. 
This process of signals development was not without its problems.  Even leaving 
aside the unpreparedness in 1941, there were many flaws in the developing system 
arising from its complexity and rush for results.  In many cases, the crash development of 
single pieces of communications equipment caused it to retain problems into production 
that might have been ironed out with greater foresight and cooperation.  For example, the 
most widely used infantryman’s radios, the SCR-300 “walkie-talkie” and SCR-536 
“handie-talkie”, couldn’t talk to each other.  Not only did the two radios not share 
frequency range, the 536 was an AM radio while the 300 was FM.  Furthermore, many of 
the radios and other equipment did not feature interchangeable components or batteries.  
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As each radio was created almost in a void, exclusive of considerations for even similar 
systems, each consequently required its own unique supply and replacement parts system.  
Of course, further developments of equipment after the war’s conclusion solved some of 
these issues, with the 536 being significantly updated for continued use.  Specifically, the 
536 was later developed to work on FM, and the tuning control was improved to allow 
the operator to quickly change frequencies by use of a plug-in crystal tuner. 
After the war, the United States was determined not to retreat back into 
isolationism, which was seen as one of the failures of the First World War’s aftermath.  
Nevertheless, a massive reduction in the armed forces from its wartime peak also 
impacted the operations and development agenda of the Signal Corps.  Failure to 
maintain wartime standards of equipment and organization directly contributed to early 
difficulties in the Korean War less than a decade later.  Just as the wartime industrial 
expansion set the stage for a massive economic boom in the US after the war, the post-
war electronics industry was also primed.   The technological developments of the Signal 
Corps thus contributed to the country’s later transformation into an electronic-reliant 
society, rather than a mechanical one. 
While it is easy to espouse the tremendous contribution made by military 
communications to the Allied victory in Europe, there is still much work to be done.  The 
US Army Center of Military History’s work has created a basis for examination, but 
additional primary research is still desperately needed.  Not only must the Army’s 
viewpoint be scrutinized and evaluated, but new work must also be done to bring the 
body of knowledge on this fledgling subject to a more current standing.  The potential for 
this subject to contribute to military academia’s evolving opinions of World War II is 
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considerable.  As is the potential for the field of military communications within general 
military history. 
The final analysis of this work must return to the importance of signals 
communication in warfare.  Once armies were motorized and able to quickly move 
around ever-larger battlefields, communications became ever more essential.  Gone 
forever were the days of commanders utilizing solely their physical presence to exert 
control.  The size and complexity of modern warfare forbade it.  Even more than seventy 
years after the end of World War II, military communications are more important than 
ever.   
Every day, at locations around the globe, signal soldiers operate the 
communications networks, both strategic and tactical, that constitute the 
Army’s “nervous system.”  These dedicated men and women preserve the 
Signal Corps’ proud traditions and uphold its motto, Pro Patria Vigilans 
(Watchful for the Country).82 
 
As military conflicts continue to evolve, militaries increasingly look for technological 
solutions to complex battlefield problems.  Military communications will always be at the 
forefront of these solutions, linking civilian leaders, commanders, and troops across vast 
distances and in every conceivable situation. 
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